National Institutions and Global Public Goods: Are Democracies More Cooperative in Climate Change Policy? by Bättig, Michèle B. & Bernauer, Thomas
National Institutions and Global
Public Goods: Are Democracies
More Cooperative in Climate
Change Policy?
Michèle B+ Bättig and Thomas Bernauer
Abstract This article examines whether democracies contribute more to the pro-
vision of global public goods+ It thus contributes to the debate on the effects of domes-
tic institutions on international cooperation+ The focus is on human-induced climate
change, in Stern’s words “the biggest market failure the world has ever seen+”1 Using
new data on climate change cooperation we study a cross-section of 185 countries in
1990–2004+ The results show that the effect of democracy on levels of political com-
mitment to climate change mitigation ~policy output! is positive+ In contrast, the effect
on policy outcomes, measured in terms of emission levels and trends, is ambiguous+
These results demonstrate that up until now the democracy effect has not been able to
override countervailing forces that emanate from the free-rider problem, discounting
of future benefits of climate change mitigation, and other factors that cut against efforts
to reduce emissions+ Even though democracies have had a slow start in moving from
political and legal commitments ~policy output! to emission reductions ~policy out-
comes!, particularly in the transportation sector, we observe some encouraging signs+
The main implication of our findings for research on international politics is that greater
efforts should be made to study policy output and outcome side by side+ This will help
in identifying whether more democratic countries experience larger “words-deeds” gaps
also in other policy areas, and whether there are systematic differences of this kind
between domestic and international commitments and across different policy areas+
Political scientists have, for analytical and normative reasons, invested much time
and effort in trying to understand the consequences of democracy+ A large amount
of research concentrates on whether democratic systems perform better in terms
The authors are grateful to Michael Bechtel, Gary Goertz, Dieter Imboden, Detlef Jahn, Anna Kal-
bhenn, Vally Koubi, Mira Marcus-Kalish, Christian Martin, Katja Michaelowa, Ken Oye, Matthew
Paterson, Michael Ross, Gabi Ruoff, Lena Schaffer, Detlef Sprinz, Jana von Stein, Hugh Ward, and
the reviewers and editors of IO for highly useful comments on earlier versions of this article+ This
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first century+
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of poverty reduction,2 economic development,3 and environmental quality+4 At the
international level, a vast literature focuses on the democratic peace hypothesis+5
International political economy scholars have examined how democracy affects
conflict and dispute settlement in the global trading system,6 and how it influences
compliance behavior in trade, monetary relations, and other areas+7 International
relations scholars have also been interested in how democracy influences the pro-
pensity of states to engage in international commitments, for example, in the form
of joining international organizations and treaties+8
The existing literature shows that the implications of democracy for solving
important policy problems, both domestically and internationally, vary considera-
bly across levels of analysis, policy problems, and empirical definitions of policy
performance+ For example, most studies on democratic peace find positive effects
for democratic dyads,9 while the monadic effects remain disputed+ The democracy
effects on socioeconomic development appear ambiguous+10 In the trade area,
democracies tend to escalate disputes more often+11 Several studies on environ-
mental performance have shown that democracies perform better in terms of domes-
tic environmental quality12 and international commitment to environmental
protection,13 but the effects on transboundary environmental problem solving are
less clear+14
Our contribution fills an important gap in this literature by focusing on the impli-
cations of democracy for the provision of global public goods+Most of the existing
literature concentrates on the provision of domestic public goods or the international
behavior of countries vis-à-vis specific other countries+ The empirical focus in this
article is on climate change+ Within the past twenty-five years, the problem of
human-induced climate change has evolved from a rather speculative scientific topic
into one of the key issues on the global policy agenda+ Nicholas Stern, former World
Bank chief economist and author of an influential study on the economic effects of
climate change, has called the latter “the biggest market failure the world has ever
seen+”15 The global scientific community, as organized through the Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change ~IPCC!, is largely in agreement that anthropo-
genic causes, and emissions from the combustion of fossil fuels in particular, are
2+ See, for example, Ross 2006+
3+ See, for example, Przeworski 2004+
4+ See, for example, Ward 2008+
5+ See, for example, Dorussen and Ward 2008+
6+ See, for example, Busch 2000+
7+ See, for example, Dai 2006+
8+ See, for example, Hafner-Burton, von Stein, and Gartzke 2008; and Neumayer 2002+
9+ See, for example, Dorussen and Ward 2008+
10+ See Ross 2006; Bueno de Mesquita et al+ 2001; and Plümper and Martin 2003+
11+ See, for example, Busch 2000+
12+ See Ward 2008; Bernauer and Koubi 2009; and Li and Reuveny 2006+
13+ See Roberts, Parks, and Vásquez 2004; and Neumayer 2002+
14+ Bernauer and Kuhn forthcoming+
15+ Stern 2007, 4+
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to blame in large part for increasing temperatures in many areas of the world and
also for increasing the global average temperature+ This community also agrees that
the economic and social effects of human-induced climate change are grave and
potentially disastrous, notably for societies with insufficient means to adapt, and
that reductions of greenhouse gas ~GHG! emissions on a large scale are required+16
The climate change issue also raises very interesting questions for scholars of
comparative and international politics+ It is one of the few policy challenges in the
international system that corresponds very closely to standard definitions of a global
public good and the tragedy of the commons+17 Everyone producing GHG emis-
sions, no matter where on earth, contributes to increasing the risks of adverse cli-
matic changes; everyone reducing GHG emissions contributes to the mitigation of
such risks+ The conventional logic of public goods theory holds that such prob-
lems are very difficult to solve,18 particularly at the global level+ There is no sin-
gle country or agency that can act as an effective central enforcer, and the costs
arising from aggregating national preferences, casting them into collectively bind-
ing global decisions, and implementing these policies are high+ Moreover, the cli-
mate change problem is a long-term, intergenerational problem and involves big
scientific challenges in trying to understand the benefits and costs of problem solv-
ing+19 The obvious difficulties in implementing the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and con-
cluding a follow-up agreement for the post-2012 period demonstrate that the
prediction of public goods theory is probably correct+20
Nonetheless, when we move from the global system perspective to cross-national
comparisons we observe that national contributions to the global public good of
climate change mitigation vary considerably, both with respect to political com-
mitments and emission behavior+ Table 1 illustrates this point+
For example, Germany scores high on political commitment and on reducing
per capita GHG emissions, as does the United Kingdom+ China, India, and Iran
appear as laggard countries on both accounts+ Australia, Brazil, Japan, and the
United States occupy the middle ground+ North Korea exhibits relatively low polit-
ical commitment, but its emissions have declined+ Conversely, Norway performs
better with respect to political commitment than to GHG reductions+
Even more surprising from the viewpoint of public goods theory, several small
countries and even some subnational political units ~for example, U+S+ cities and
states! have adopted ambitious mitigation targets+ Small actors can, individually,
make only a small contribution to solving the overall problem and should thus
have an especially strong incentive to free-ride on the efforts of bigger actors+
Why, apparently, do some countries contribute more to the global public good
of climate change mitigation than others? Can we say anything generic about the
16+ See Stern 2007; and IPCC 2007+
17+ Hardin 1968+
18+ See, for example, Barrett 2005; and Sandler 2004+
19+ IPCC 2007+
20+ See, for example, Cass 2006; and Victor 2001+
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factors that motivate countries to behave more ~or less! cooperatively? The eco-
nomics literature views environmental outcomes ~such as GHG emissions! as deter-
mined largely by economic factors, like economic output, income, industrial
structure, trade, and so on+21 On occasion, economic models include some politi-
cal control variables, but without much theoretical discussion+ Moreover, eco-
nomic models pay little attention to policy output ~political commitments!, whereas
the political science literature on environmental policy concentrates quite heavily
on explaining policy output, rather than policy outcomes+
We address both gaps in this article+ First, we concentrate on examining the
effects of political institutions on climate change mitigation efforts+ It is almost a
truism among political scientists that domestic institutions affect international pol-
itics+ But there is much less agreement, theoretically and empirically, on which
particular institutional properties shape policy outputs and outcomes+22 We con-
tribute to this research by studying whether and how democracy affects national
behavior with respect to the provision of global public goods in the case of cli-
mate change mitigation+We focus on the effects of democracy because democracy
is arguably the most fundamental feature that distinguishes national political sys-
tems in global comparison+ Some of the theoretical arguments and empirical find-
ings reported in the existing literature support the claim that democracy is conducive
21+ See, for example, Cole and Neumayer 2005; and Antweiler, Copeland, and Taylor 2001+
22+ See, for example, Przeworski 2004+
TABLE 1. Differences in climate change policy across countries
Country Commitment
GHG/cap change
1980–2004 (%)
GHG/cap change
1990–2004 (%)
Australia 0+65 0+7 0+9
Brazil 0+58 0+5 1+8
China 0+65 4+0 4+4
Germany 0+85 1+3 1+3
India 0+60 3+9 2+9
Indonesia 0+56 4+4 4+5
Iran 0+45 2+6 3+9
Japan 0+65 0+9 0+8
North Korea 0+52 2+8 4+6
Norway 0+83 1+0 1+8
United Kingdom 0+95 0+5 0+6
United States 0+63 0+2 0+1
Notes: The commitment variable ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 expressing the strongest political commitment to climate
change mitigation+ This variable is defined in the empirical design section below+ GHG0cap is defined as the average
annual change in per capita GHG emissions, excluding land use change, in CO2 equivalents+
Sources: Bättig, Brander, and Imboden 2008; CAIT 2008+
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to international public goods provision in the environmental realm+23 But others
are ambiguous or even negative+24 We will develop and test the hypothesis that,
ceteris paribus, democracies are more cooperative with respect to climate change
mitigation efforts+ We theorize that the democracy effect hinges on whether the
median voter and0or influential interest groups prefer more public goods provi-
sion and conclude that both the demand for, and supply of, climate mitigation
measures are likely to be stronger in democracies+ Furthermore, we argue that the
democracy effect on environmental policy outcome is likely to be weaker than on
policy output+
The empirical testing was done on a cross-section of 185 countries in 1990–
2004+ We used new data on climate change cooperation that allowed us to study
the effects of democracy on policy output and policy outcomes side by side+ The
existing literature has focused either on one or the other dependent variable+ Our
results confirm that distinguishing between policy output and policy outcome is
important+ Democracies contribute more to the global public good in terms of pol-
icy output+ In contrast, the democracy effect on policy outcomes is ambiguous+
Our interpretation of these results is that in moving from political commitments
to reductions of GHG emissions, the democracy effect has, up to this point in time,
not been able to override countervailing forces that emanate from the free-rider prob-
lem, the discounting of future benefits of climate change mitigation, and other fac-
tors that cut against efforts to reduce emissions+ We also observe that democratic
countries are experiencing greater difficulties in coping with emissions from trans-
portation, where emission cuts are most likely to require restrictions on personal
freedom ~mobility!+ The main implication of our findings for research on inter-
national politics more broadly is that greater efforts should be undertaken to study
policy output and outcome side by side+ This will help in identifying whether more
democratic countries also experience larger “words-deeds” gaps in other policy
areas, and whether there are systematic differences of this kind between domestic
and international commitments and across different policy areas+
Theory
If each country were equally affected by the free-rider problem associated with
the production of global public goods, countries around the globe would, in the
absence of other influences, be equally reluctant to contribute to the provision of
such goods+ Table 1 suggests that this is not the case+ Moreover, in climate change
policy, smaller countries whose emission reductions can contribute only mini-
mally to solving the overall problem, should have a strong motivation to wait and
let the big countries move ahead first+ A simple test questions this assumption+ In
23+ See, for example, Ward 2008; Neumayer 2002; and Li and Reuveny 2006+
24+ See, for example, Congleton 1992; and Midlarsky 1998+
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the data set we use for this article ~see below!, the correlation between country
size—in terms of population or gross domestic product ~GDP!—and GHG emis-
sion growth rates, as well as other indicators for countries’ performance in climate
change mitigation efforts, is close to zero+ That is, on average, smaller countries
are neither less nor more cooperative+
A likely explanation for the cross-country variance we observed is that institu-
tions matter+ Political institutions differ along many dimensions+We are interested
in the effects of democracy+ Democracy is arguably the most fundamental charac-
teristic when comparing national political institutions globally+25 Our basic argu-
ment is that democracy has a positive effect on the demand for and supply of
public goods, including global public goods such as climate change mitigation,
and that this effect is likely to be stronger with respect to policy output than pol-
icy outcome+We arrive at this argument by first outlining the fundamental reasons
for the expected positive democracy effect and then addressing two caveats+
Olson, McGuire and Olson, and other authors have argued that nondemocratic
polities tend to underprovide public goods+26 They are usually governed by small
elites who seek to increase their personal wealth at the expense of the population+
Hence they have little interest in foregoing private benefits, such as spending tax
income on personal consumption or to buy loyalty from cronies, in order to invest
in greater amounts of public goods—such as higher levels of environmental
quality—that would benefit large parts of the population+ That is, public goods are
underprovided if opportunity costs associated with public goods provision are con-
centrated on a small elite, whereas the benefits are widely dispersed+ In democra-
cies, provision levels of public goods are influenced much more strongly by the
preferences of the median voter or, in a more open formulation, prevailing inter-
ests among the electorate+ The median voter ~or the individual member of the elec-
torate! in democracies incurs smaller opportunity costs from more environmental
protection, relative to the median member of the ruling elite in a nondemocracy+
Collective action theory tells us that the former cost-benefit distribution is more
conducive to public goods provision than the latter+27
An extension by Bueno de Mesquita and colleagues of the aforementioned argu-
ment focuses on how institutions influence the selection of political leaders and
their incentives to provide public goods+28 They claim that the extent to which
governments provide public goods relative to private ones is determined by the
size of the “selectorate” ~those who affect the selection of and receive benefits
from the leaders! and the size of the winning coalition ~the subset of the selec-
torate that is needed to bring or keep leaders in office!+ In nondemocracies, the
25+ See Przeworski 2004; and Munck and Verkuilen 2002+ Obviously, climate change is a global
problem that requires cooperation by all countries worldwide, at the very least in terms relative to their
GHG emissions+ This justifies a global perspective+
26+ See Olson 1993; McGuire and Olson 1996+
27+ See Stigler 1971; and Olson 1968+
28+ Bueno de Mesquita et al+ 2003+ See also Bernauer and Koubi 2009+
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winning coalition is usually small relative to the selectorate+ In such systems,
leaders thus need to deliver a relatively large amount of private goods to a small
number of essential supporters to be able to remain in power+ In contrast, in democ-
racies the winning coalition is large relative to the selectorate+ Political leaders in
democratic systems do not have sufficient resources to reward their supporters
with large amounts of private goods+ Moreover, loyalty to the incumbent tends to
be weaker in democracies than in autocracies ~that is, the probability of defec-
tion from winning coalitions is higher in democracies!+ Weaker loyalty of sup-
porters forces democratic political leaders to deliver policies that provide relatively
large amounts of public goods if they wish to survive politically+ In autocracies,
loyalty of elite members to incumbents is usually higher, and this motivates auto-
cratic leaders to deliver more private goods to the small elite that keeps them in
power+
This optimism ~at the theoretical level! about superior performance of democ-
racies in terms of public goods provision has encountered criticism of various sorts+
We address what we regard as the two most important caveats and conclude that
only the second of these caveats requires a modification of the basic hypothesis+
This caveat leads us to distinguish democracy effects on policy outputs from effects
on policy outcomes+
Caveat 1: The Demand Side
The democracy effect argument presented above has both demand- and supply-
side components+ As to the supply side, it seems reasonable to assume that, at any
given level of public demand, democratic leaders are likely to experience greater
incentives than autocratic leaders to satisfy this demand+ The demand side is more
problematic+ Extant research has not systematically dealt with the possibility that
the median voter does not prefer more environmental quality, or that parochial
interest groups dominate the political process+
It is quite intuitive to assume that the median voter in a democracy will usually
be more enthusiastic about public goods provision than the median elite member
in a nondemocracy+ Examples are public schools, public infrastructure ~for exam-
ple, water supply and sanitation, hospitals, electricity, telecommunications!, or clean
air+ We cannot assume automatically, however, that demand for any type of public
good is greater in democracies than in autocracies+ The existing literature does not
offer systematic empirical evidence on this issue+29 But we argue that there are
several reasons why the median voter in democracies will, on average, be “greener”
than the median elite member in nondemocracies+
29+ See Diekmann and Franzen 1999; and Franzen and Meyer 2004+ All large-scale surveys, such
as the International Social Survey Program, focus primarily on democratic countries and do not allow
us to determine whether, ceteris paribus, individual environmental preferences are also shaped by the
political system+
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Critics may object that the median elite member in a nondemocracy tends to be
wealthier and better educated than the median voter in a democracy and, assum-
ing that environmental quality is a “normal” good,30 thus demands more environ-
mental quality+31 At least four arguments cut against this idea+ First, democracies
are on average richer than autocracies+32 It is also well established in the literature
that political participation of richer voters in democracies is higher+ Consequently,
the de facto median voter in democracies may not be poorer than the median elite
member in nondemocracies+ Second, the median elite member in an autocracy will
usually have more opportunities than the average member of the country’s popu-
lation to shield that elite member from negative consequences that may arise from
the underprovision of public goods+ For example, that elite member can move to a
less polluted place within the country ~or abroad!+ Wealthy persons in democra-
cies can, of course, do the same+ But this does not undermine demand for public
goods provision to the same extent it does in nondemocracies, where the median
elite member has more political influence+ Third, as noted above, opportunity costs
of environmental policies are likely to be higher for the median elite member in a
nondemocracy than the median voter in a democracy+ The anticipated net benefits
of environmental policy will thus be smaller for the median elite member in a
nondemocracy+ That is, even if the median elite member in an autocracy were
greener than the democratic median voter, higher opportunity costs are more likely
to lead that member to negative expected net benefits of more environmental pro-
tection+ Fourth, greater freedom to engage in research, communicate, exchange
new evidence on environmental risks, and travel to and obtain information from
other countries is likely to make the public in democratic countries more aware of
environmental problems and possibilities for their mitigation+33 This applies par-
ticularly to more complex, less visible, and less local risks ~for example, climate
change!+
Criticism of the democracy-environment hypothesis has also focused on the role
of interest groups, arguing that the preferences of the median voter may matter
less in the policymaking process than the preferences of influential interest groups+
Some critics have claimed that in advanced democracies ever greater interest group
pluralism may reduce the provision of public goods+34 Politicians are forced to
adopt more and more policies that cater to narrowly defined short-term interests
of particular groups instead of longer-term interests of the public as a whole+
30+ See, for example, Cole and Neumayer 2005+
31+ At least some forms of environmental degradation are characterized by an environmental Kuz-
nets curve ~EKC! ~see Grossman and Krueger 1995!+ Pollution first increases with income as people
favor increased economic output over improvement of environmental quality+ Once income has reached
a higher level and basic material needs have been met, the willingness to invest more in “postmaterial”
goods, such as environmental quality, increases+
32+ Correlations between various measures of income and democracy are usually in the order of 0+4
to 0+6+
33+ See also Payne 1995+
34+ See, for example, Olson 1982; and Midlarsky 1998+
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Increasingly strong competition among interest groups may also make it harder to
adopt policies that depart substantively from the status quo ~gridlock problem!+
While it is possible that more mature democracies are characterized by more inter-
est group activity, and increasing activity of this nature increases the likelihood of
gridlock, we are not aware of any systematic studies that demonstrate such effects
for a large sample of countries in environmental policy+
Critics of the democracy-environment hypothesis have also referred to the Olson-
ian notion that concentrated interests are easier to organize than diffuse interests+
To the extent that the costs of slowing down or halting environmental degradation
fall primarily on business, whereas the population as a whole benefits, we should
expect that business holds less green preferences than the median voter, and that
business is able to organize more effectively+ Since virtually all highly democratic
countries are advanced market economies where the private sector plays the key role
in innovation and economic growth, the combination of economic and political free-
dom may favor business interests over the interests of the median voter and may
hence slow progress in environmental policy+While the literature on interest group
activity in economic policymaking offers some evidence for greater influence of
business relative to other interests,35 the environmental policy literature provides
many examples where business interests have been overwhelmed by environmen-
tal interests+36 In some cases, international cooperation—for example, the agree-
ments to protect the stratospheric ozone layer—was even facilitated by “green and
greedy” coalitions among business stakeholders and environmental interests+37
Rather than creating gridlock, increasing interest group pluralism may thus
weaken the pro-business bias of interest group politics and hence promote green
interests+ If, for instance, greater pluralism in advanced democracies decreases the
effectiveness of behind-the-doors lobbying by industry ~whose preferences are pre-
sumably less green!, environmental interest groups may in fact gain greater influ-
ence because industry has traditionally been more influential in behind-the-doors
lobbying+ Beck, Aerni, and others have argued that in mature democracies, inter-
est groups have in recent years been competing harder and harder for the attention
of the public, and that public trust has become a key political resource in this
process+38 Surveys have shown that in many countries the general public has more
confidence in the information provided by nongovernmental organizations ~NGOs!
than the information provided by business+39 In many cases, this loss of confi-
dence in business as a stakeholder has put policymakers under intense pressure to
shield constituencies from an ever larger range of risks, including environmental
risks, often at the expense of business interests+ In addition, more pluralistic soci-
eties tend to exhibit lower levels of corruption+ Corruption is one of the mecha-
35+ See, for example, Dryzek 1987+
36+ See, for example, Vogel 2005; Bernauer and Caduff 2004; and Bernauer 2003+
37+ See, for example, Oye and Maxwell 1994+
38+ See Beck 1986; and Aerni 2005+
39+ Aerni 2005+
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nisms through which business interests can obtain political influence, and it directs
government resources to the production of private goods+ In other words, if democ-
racy promotes interest group pluralism, such pluralism may well lead to more rather
than less provision of public goods+
In summary, both demand and supply arguments point, on balance, toward a net
democracy effect that is positive+ Demand for environmental public goods provi-
sion is likely to be at least equally strong, and probably stronger, in democracies
than in nondemocracies+ At any given level of public demand for public goods
provision larger than the status quo ~or greater than zero!, democratic systems are
more likely to supply the desired public goods+
Caveat 2: National Versus Global Public Goods, Policy Output
Versus Policy Outcome
A primary characteristic of climate change mitigation is that it is a global public
good, that is, the geographic scope of the problem is not congruent with national
territories+ Since democratic processes operate primarily within the domestic sphere,
constituencies and politicians may be less interested in resolving international or
global issues relative to domestic problems+40 Consequently, we may find that
democracy is helpful in dealing with local or national public goods problems, such
as local air or water pollution, but not necessarily with complex global problems+
However, this argument does not invalidate the democracy-environment hypoth-
esis+ Even if the global public goods nature of climate change mitigation weakens
the democracy effect, this weakening should be viewed as relative to other public
goods problems ~notably local or national public goods!+ There is no reason to
assume that any such weakening should be systematically stronger with respect to
democracies than nondemocracies+
However, this caveat motivates us to pay more attention to the distinction between
policy output and policy outcome+ The problem of human-induced climate change
has been on the global policy agenda for only about fifteen years, but designing
and implementing mitigation policies is complex, costly, and time-consuming+We
should thus expect that democracy effects vary across policy output and policy
outcome, with democracy having a weaker effect on policy outcomes+ This possi-
bility was noted by Neumayer several years ago with respect to other environmen-
tal degradation issues but has been largely ignored in subsequent research+41
The principal reason to study policy output and outcomes side by side and to
expect a weaker democracy effect on outcomes is that the causal chain from envi-
ronmental risks to public perceptions of such risks, to public demand for risk mit-
igation, and to policy output is shorter than the one leading from risk via policy
output to policy outcome+ Because of that, outcomes are, to the extent policies are
40+ See, for example, Paehlke 1996+
41+ Neumayer 2002+
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effective, influenced by policy output, but also by a range of other factors, such as
properties of the resource in question, mitigation costs, efficiency of implement-
ing agencies, and so on+ Whereas policy outputs are largely under the control of
policymakers, policy outcomes may be affected also by factors that are outside of
their control+ Under conditions of complete information, policymakers will cor-
rectly determine the level of environmental protection that provides a net benefit
~benefit from risk mitigation minus mitigation costs, including implementation costs!
and meets median voter or prevailing interest group demands+ They will also antici-
pate potential implementation problems and design effective monitoring and
enforcement mechanisms to that end+ But more often than not, such assumptions
are violated in the real world+ In fact, a common observation in many studies on
environmental policy is that policymakers often respond quite well to public
demands for more environmental protection, but tend to discount implementation
problems, hoping that voters will not be able to identify these problems within a
short-enough time-period to be able to punish policymakers+
In sum, the theoretical reasoning in this section produces two hypotheses that
will be tested in the remainder of this article+
H1: More democratic countries exhibit stronger political commitment to climate
change mitigation+
H2: More democratic countries contribute more to climate change mitigation in
terms of emission reduction. However, this positive democracy effect is weaker
than the democracy effect on policy output+
Empirical Design
Approach
Focusing on climate change mitigation subjects the democracy-environment hypoth-
esis to a particularly hard test+ Because the focus is on national contributions to a
global public good associated with substantial scientific uncertainty, a strong free-
riding problem, and rather high mitigation costs, any significant, positive effect of
democracy will be more convincing than in the case of more local, more visible,
and scientifically less-contested environmental degradation issues ~for example,
local air or water pollution!+
The existing literature has produced contradictory results for the democracy effect
in climate change mitigation policy+ Congleton reports that democracies have higher
levels of methane and CFC emissions per capita ~his sample included 118 coun-
tries in 1989!+42 Midlarsky finds that more democratic countries have higher per
capita carbon dioxide ~CO2! emissions ~his sample included ninety-eight coun-
42+ Congleton 1992+
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tries in 1990!+43 Gleditsch and Sverdrup find that democracy reduces CO2 emis-
sions per capita ~their sample included 108 countries in 1990!+44 Li and Reuveny
obtain mixed results for CO2 emissions per capita ~their sample included 143 coun-
tries from 1961 to 1997!: while the effect of a continuous indicator for democracy
~Polity IV! is negative and significant, it is positive but not significant for a dichot-
omous indicator of democracy, and positive and significant for a dichotomous indi-
cator of autocracy+45 As to policy output, a recent study by von Stein finds that
democracy tends to have a positive effect on formal participation in global cli-
mate change policy ~the sample included 140 countries from 1992 to 2005!+46
The empirical results for the democracy-climate policy hypothesis we just dis-
cussed are likely to differ due to differences in sampling ~number of countries,
cross-sectional analysis for individual years or time-periods versus panel data analy-
sis! and different definitions of the dependent variable ~emission levels versus trends,
policy outcomes versus policy output!+We opt for a more comprehensive approach,
focusing on 185 countries since 1990, when the climate change issue moved onto
the global policy agenda, and examining policy output and outcome side by side+
The analysis is cross-sectional because year-to-year changes on our dependent vari-
ables and the main independent variable ~democracy! are much smaller than cross-
sectional variation+ The data analysis relies on ordinary least squares ~OLS! with
robust standard errors ~Huber-White estimator!+
The dependent variable measures levels of public goods provision in climate
change mitigation across countries+ It is defined in four forms: in terms of indices
for policy output and policy outcome, as well as indicators for emission levels and
emission trends+ The first index captures policy output; the second index and the
two emissions indicators measure policy outcomes+We use three measures for pol-
icy outcomes to distinguish emission levels and emission trends because there is
disagreement in the literature over which concept is more appropriate+ Murdoch
and Sandler and some other authors argue that pollution levels may not be appro-
priate when examining the effect of democracy on policy outcomes, and that one
should study trends ~or changes!; that is, whether democracy contributes to emis-
sion reductions+47 We agree that the latter approach is better connected to the basic
proposition: we do not argue that democracies are “cleaner” at any given point in
time; rather, we claim that democracies make a bigger effort to improve their envi-
ronmental behavior+
Our principal empirical models explain public goods provision as a function of
democracy, controlling for climate change risk exposure, income, mitigation costs,
trade, and other factors+ The robustness of findings is assessed in a variety of ways+
43+ Midlarsky 1998+
44+ Gleditsch and Sverdrup 2003+
45+ Li and Reuveny 2006+
46+ von Stein 2008a+
47+ Murdoch and Sandler 1997+ Neumayer 2002, 144, points to this problem in studies by Midlar-
sky 1998; Torras and Boyce 1998; and Barrett and Graddy 2000+
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We start by excluding the richest countries from the sample because most of the
richest countries are highly democratic+ Their inclusion might thus bias the results+
We also examine the robustness of findings by using alternative indicators for
democracy, climate change risk exposure, income, mitigation costs, and trade, and
by running the models for the four component indicators of the policy output index
separately+ In addition, we add a wide range of other control variables+ We then
reassess the basic results by implementing the models for a climate change coop-
eration index from another source—that index includes emission levels, emission
trends, and a policy component+ The final part examines the effect of democracy
on GHG emissions by particular economic sectors, notably electricity and heat pro-
duction, and transportation+
Variables
Table 2 offers an overview of variables and data sources+ Policy output mea-
sures the extent of political, legal, and administrative commitments to the UN-based
climate change mitigation process+ This index is based on Bättig, Brander, and
Imboden48 and includes the following indicators: ~1! the UN Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change ~UNFCCC! indicator, which is composed of two
equally weighted indicators measuring whether the country has ratified the
UNFCCC ~yes  1, no  0! and how fast it has done so ~declining scale from
1992 through 1997!; ~2! the Kyoto indicator, which is composed of two equally
weighted indicators measuring whether the country has ratified the Kyoto Proto-
col ~yes  1, no  0! and how fast it has done so ~declining scale from 1998
through 2005!; ~3! the reporting indicator, which is composed of two equally
weighted indicators measuring whether the country has submitted the latest national
climate report ~yes  1, no  0! and whether it has done so in time; and ~4! the
funding indicator, which measures how often a country has made its financial
contributions to the UNFCCC secretariat in time between 1996 and 2005 ~linear
scale according to the number of contributions in time!+ The values of the four
components are added with equal weight since there is no compelling argument
for why one or the other component should be more important+ The values of the
policy output index are standardized on a 0 to 1 scale+ Higher values indicate
more cooperative behavior+
Policy outcomes are measured in three ways+ The policy outcome index assesses
primarily emission trends+ It is composed of two elements: 1990 levels of CO2
emissions per capita in relation to GDP per capita; and the trend of CO2 emissions
per capita in relation to GDP per capita between 1990 and 2002+ The latter ele-
ment of the index captures the trend of emissions compared to a quadratic func-
tion fitted into the emissions of thirteen EU countries in the 1870 to 2002 period+
That is, it uses a fitted environmental Kuznets curve as a benchmark and measures
48+ Bättig, Brander, and Imboden 2008+
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how well a country performs in relation to this benchmark+ Relating emission trends
and levels to income offers an indication of how well countries are coping with
the challenge of growing economically without excessively damaging the natural
environment+ The values of the index, whose construction is described in greater
TABLE 2. Variables in the principal models
Variables Definition Source
output Index of cooperative behavior in climate
change policy, defined in policy output
terms; scale: 0+ + +1, higher values
indicate more cooperative behavior;
1990–2005+
Based on Bättig,
Brander, and
Imboden 2008
outcome Index of cooperative behavior in climate
change policy, defined in emissions
related terms; scale: 0+ + +1, higher
values indicate more cooperative
behavior; 1990–2003+
Based on Bättig,
Brander, and
Imboden 2008
emisslevel Natural log of CO2 emissions per capita;
1990–2004 averages; transformed to
0+ + +1 scale and inverted; higher values
indicate more cooperative behavior+
Based on CAIT 2008
emisstrend Average annual growth rate of CO2
emissions per capita; 1990–2004
averages; transformed to 0+ + +1 scale
and inverted; higher values indicate
more cooperative behavior+
Based on CAIT 2008
democracy Political rights index by Freedom House;
1990–2005 averages; scale of original
data inverted, 1+ + +7, higher values
indicate more democracy+
Freedom House 2006
cci Climate Change Index; index of climate
change risk exposure; scale: 0+ + +1,
higher values indicate greater risk for
the respective country+
Bättig, Wild, and
Imboden 2007
income, incomesquare GDP per capita in PPP ~1990 international
Geary-Khamis dollars!; natural log of
averages for 1990–2003 or most recent
year for which data was available+
income  ln~GDP per capita!
incomesquare  ~ln~GDP per capita!!2
Maddison 2007
gdpgrowth Average annual growth of GDP per capita+ World Bank 2006;
Maddison 2007
co2cap1990 CO2 emissions per capita in 1990+ CAIT 2008
oilgascoal Sum of oil, gas and coal production per
capita ~all in millions of tons of oil
equivalents!; 1990–2005 ~or most recent
year! averages+
Based on data from
British Petroleum
2007
tradeopen Trade openness ~imports plus exports
divided by GDP!, 1990–2000+
Gleditsch 2006
Note: the dependent variables are shown in the shaded area of the table+
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detail in Bättig and colleagues are standardized on a 0 to 1 scale+49 Higher values
indicate more cooperative behavior+ In addition, we use two indicators whose def-
inition is more simple and straightforward: CO2 emissions per capita ~emisslevel!,
and growth of CO2 emissions per capita ~emisstrend!+ For both indicators we use
1990–2004 averages+ To facilitate comparison with the policy output and outcome
indices, we invert the scale of emisslevel and emisstrend, so that higher values
indicate lower emissions and thus greater contributions to the global public good+
We standardize the values to a 0 to 1 scale+ We would like to emphasize at this
point that the three policy outcome variables measure emission behavior in the
broadest possible manner; they do not measure compliance with Kyoto commit-
ments or the effectiveness of such commitments+
democracy is measured with the Freedom House political rights index+50 We
use this index primarily because it is available for a larger number of countries
and more recent years than the Polity IV index51 and other indices for democracy+
We invert the original scale, making 1 the least and 7 the most democratic score,
and use 1990–2005 averages+
All models include a set of control variables+ The Climate Change Index ~cci!
is based on predictions of future annual and seasonal temperature and precipita-
tion+ It captures the degree of future climate change relative to today’s natural
variability and is calculated on the basis of three global climate model ~GCM!
simulations of the twenty-first century under the IPCC emission scenarios A2 and
B2+ While this indicator does not measure climate impacts ~for example, in terms
of how many percentages climate change could reduce GDP within particular time-
frames! it provides a reasonably clear picture of how strong climatic change in
individual countries is likely to be+52 Higher values on a 0 to 1 scale indicate higher
risk exposure of a country+ We include this control variable because most theories
of international environmental cooperation argue that risk-exposure plays a cen-
tral role in accounting for why countries respond differently to any given category
of international problems+53 We expect the index to have a positive effect on coop-
erative behavior+
income is measured as the natural logarithm of GDP per capita+54 We use aver-
ages for 1990–2002 ~or the most recent year for which data is available!+ We
also include the squared value of this indicator to account for the possibility of
an environmental Kuznets curve+55 We expect a positive, linear effect of income
49+ Ibid+
50+ Freedom House 2006+
51+ Marshall and Jaggers 2007+
52+ For a more detailed description, see Bättig, Wild, and Imboden 2007+
53+ See, for example, Sprinz and Vaahtoranta 1994; and Social Learning Group 2001+
54+ PPP, 1990 U+S+ dollars+
55+ A common assumption in the environmental economics literature is that pollution first grows
with income and, at some point that may vary across pollutants and countries, starts to decline+ If this
inverted U-shape—the so-called environmental Kuznets curve ~EKC!—effect exists, the income vari-
able should have a negative and the squared income variable a positive coefficient+
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on policy output+ Except for the models including outcome as the dependent
variable, the models also include economic growth ~gdpgrowth!+ For models
including emission levels and trends as dependent variables we expect nonlinear
effects of GDP growth+ At lower levels of income, growth is likely to increase
emissions+ At higher levels of income, it is likely to be associated with nonin-
creasing or decreasing emissions+ All models include a trade openness ~tradeopen!
variable ~exports plus imports divided by GDP!+ The existing literature56 is divided
on whether trade effects are positive, negative, or insignificant+ The main reason
for uncertainty about the direction and size of trade effects is that trade may
have effects on economic structure ~composition!, economic output ~scale!, and
income57; it is empirically open which of the three effects dominates or whether
they offset each other+
We include a variable that proxies for mitigation costs+ There is no agreement in
the literature on how to estimate mitigation costs+58 We opt for a simple indicator—
CO2 emissions per capita in 1990 ~co2cap1990!—but assess the impact of alter-
native measures in our robustness checks+ We acknowledge that the effect of the
chosen indicator may cut both ways+ Countries with higher per capita emissions
may be less energy-efficient and may thus find it easier to reduce emissions, at least
for some time+ Conversely, to the extent that international notions of fairness demand
that in the long term such countries have to bring their emissions down to some
uniform per capita level ~many proposals refer to this as “carbon justice” and often
refer to two to five tons of CO2 per capita and year!, they may be less willing to
cooperate+ We use this indicator in all models except those for the policy outcome
index—CO2 emissions per capita are used in the construction of that index+ Instead,
we use fossil fuel production in those models, assuming that producers of fossil
fuels ~oil, gas, coal! will, for economic reasons, be less interested in contributing
to climate change mitigation+ This indicator is defined as total fossil fuel produc-
tion ~oil, coal, gas, all in oil equivalents! per capita ~oilgascoal!+59
The policy output index is included as a control variable in the models for emis-
sion levels and trends, assuming that politically more committed countries are per-
forming better in political outcome terms as well+
Results
We start by estimating the effect of democracy on four indicators for national
contributions to global climate change mitigation: ~1! policy output; ~2! policy
outcome; ~3! emission levels ~emisslevel!; and ~4! changes in emission levels
56+ See, for example, Cole and Neumayer 2005+
57+ Antweiler, Copeland, and Taylor 2001+
58+ See, for example, Stern 2007+
59+ We do not use fossil fuel consumption because the available data is less reliable and rather
incomplete, and because GHG emissions are directly related to fossil fuel consumption+
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~emisstrend!+ All dependent variables are scaled from 0 to 1, with higher values
indicating larger contributions to the global public good+60 Table 3 shows the
estimates+
Democracy has a positive and significant effect on policy output and on the
emission level variable+ These effects are substantial: a one-point increase in democ-
racy ~around 17 percent on the 1+ + +7 scale! produces a 3+2 percent increase in
policy output and a 1 percent increase in policy outcome defined in terms of emis-
sion levels+ If democracy levels change from those of China ~minimum! to those
of Canada ~maximum!, this increases policy output by 19 percent and improves
emission levels by 6 percent+ These results support hypotheses ~1! and ~2!+ Hypoth-
esis ~1! ~as tested in Model 1, Table 3! claims that more democratic countries
exhibit greater political commitment to climate change mitigation+ Hypothesis ~2!
60+ The data set, Stata do-files, and a paper presenting additional empirical results ~for example,
robustness checks! are available from the authors+
TABLE 3. Effects of democracy
Variables
Model 1
output
Model 2
outcome
Model 3
emisslevel
Model 4
emisstrend
democracy 0+0312*** 0+0227*** 0+0095** 0+0025
~0+0088! ~0+0087! ~0+0038! ~0+0059!
cci 0+1431 0+1192 0+0063 0+1774***
~0+0940! ~0+1157! ~0+0401! ~0+0521!
income 0+0599*** 0+7305*** 0+1189
~0+0191! ~0+0848! ~0+1260!
income2 0+0368*** 0+0053
~0+0053! ~0+0075!
gdpgrowth 0+0068 0+0040** 0+0144*
~0+0053! ~0+0018! ~0+0074!
co2cap1990 0+0050* 0+0142*** 0+0072***
~0+0027! ~0+0021! ~0+0016!
oilgascoal 442+0084***
~111+0305!
tradeopen 0+0436** 0+1115** 0+0121 0+0070
~0+0201! ~0+0524! ~0+0168! ~0+0153!
output 0+1378 0+0483 0+0678
~0+0883! ~0+0417! ~0+0629!
Constant 0+1211 0+6017*** 3+8572*** 1+2871**
~0+1337! ~0+0888! ~0+3437! ~0+5322!
Observations 172 182 172 171
R-squared 0+325 0+207 0+881 0+288
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses+ * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%+
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~as tested in Model 3, Table 3! holds that more democratic countries perform bet-
ter in reducing their emissions, though this effect is likely to be weaker+ Indeed,
the democracy coefficient in Model 3 is significantly smaller than in Model 1+
The effects of democracy on the policy outcome index and emission trends ~Mod-
els 2 and 4, Table 3! cut against hypothesis ~2!+61 The effect of democracy on the
former is negative and significant, the effect on the latter is positive but insignifi-
cant; that is, the results shown in Table 3 support hypothesis ~1! but offer only
very limited support for hypothesis ~2!+
The coefficients for the climate change index show that risk exposure does not
motivate countries to contribute to the global public good+ In the model for emis-
sion trends, the effect is even negative and significant+ We interpret this finding in
the sense that available scientific information on climate change has not ~yet?!
spurred sufficient public demand for risk mitigation, that the free-rider problem
reduces demand for and supply of risk mitigation measures, or both+
As expected, the income effect on policy output is positive and significant+62
We also implemented the model with income divided by the Gini index to approx-
imate the income of the median voter+ The results ~not shown here! are very sim-
ilar+ The environmental Kuznets curve effect is strong in the models for emission
levels and follows the expected pattern: emissions increase with income, and at
high levels of income start to decrease+ This effect is similar for emission trends,
but much weaker+ Economic growth has a heterogeneous effect+ It has no signifi-
cant effect on policy output, a positive effect in terms of lower emission levels,
but an adverse effect on emission trends+ The expected Kuznets curve effect for
GDP growth does not show up in our data+ We cross-checked this result using an
interaction term for income and growth+ The results ~not shown here! are very
similar+ Per capita CO2 emission levels in 1990 have a significant, negative effect
on policy output and the emission level variable, but a significant, positive effect
on the emission trend variable+ Production of fossil fuels has the expected nega-
tive effect on public goods provision+ The same effect shows up when we use this
variable in the other models in lieu of 1990 CO2 emissions per capita+ The nega-
tive effect of trade openness on policy output supports the regulatory chill over
the trading-up hypothesis+63 Countries that are more open to international trade
are more reluctant to commit to climate change mitigation+
Our data can also be used to test whether democracies find it easier or harder
to bring their self-selected political commitment levels in line with their environ-
61+ The overall properties of Model 2 are somewhat problematic because fossil fuel production
~whose distribution is very skewed! is by far the strongest determinant+
62+ Multicolinearity problems in the models reported in Table 3 are minor+ The highest bivariate
correlations among explanatory variables are those between income and democracy ~0+59! and income
and per capita CO2 levels in 1990 ~0+62!+ The results are consistent across the full sample ~all coun-
tries in our data set! and a reduced sample that excluded the richest 10 percent of the countries in the
data set+
63+ Vogel 1995+
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mental behavior+ To start with, the effect of the policy output variable in the emis-
sion level and trend models is positive in most of our models, but statistically
significant in only one of them+ This suggests that, for all countries in our sam-
ple, “words and deeds” are not strongly related+ What role does democracy play
in this context? To assess this effect, we constructed a new dependent variable+
This variable is defined as the policy outcome ~the sum of the emisslevel and
emisstrend variable, standardized to a 0 to 1 scale! minus the policy output vari-
able+ 1 on this scale identifies countries that are investing far more in words
than in deeds, 1 identifies countries at the opposite end+ When we implement
the exact same model as for emisslevel for this new dependent variable, we
find that both democracy and income have a significant negative effect ~results
not shown here!+ That is, rich and democratic countries are particularly prone to
perform better at the political commitment level than in terms of cutting their
emissions+
Our results for the policy output index correspond to findings by von Stein,64
which to our knowledge is the most sophisticated large-N study focusing on pol-
icy output in the climate change area+65 The results for emissions-related behavior
are helpful in addressing contradictory findings by Gleditsch and Sverdrup, Li and
Reuveny, Congleton, and Midlarsky+66 As noted above, focusing on emission trends
rather than levels may offer a more appropriate test of the democracy-environment
hypothesis+ We should expect that, ever since climate change policy emerged on
the international agenda in the mid- to late 1980s, democracies have been doing a
better job in dealing with the problem, irrespective of whether their emission lev-
els were higher or not at the outset of the process ~we control for this possibility
by including 1990 CO2 emissions per capita!+ The democracy coefficient in the
model for the policy outcome index turns out to be negative and significant, in the
model for emission trends it is positive but insignificant+ The overall conclusion is
that we should be very cautious and perhaps even skeptical in interpreting the
positive democracy effect on emission levels as confirmation of the democracy-
environment hypothesis+
How robust are these results? For a start, we examined whether excluding the
richest 10 percent of the sample ~most of these countries are highly democratic!
changes the results+ It does not+ We then explored whether outliers and0or skewed
distributions of variables affected the results, but we did not identify significant
problems of this kind+ For example, we examined the effects of dropping particu-
lar countries that appeared as outliers+ The results are robust to excluding Iceland,
Suriname, and Andorra+ These three countries are outliers on the policy output,
64+ von Stein 2008a+
65+ The income indicators are not used in the models with outcome as the dependent variable
because the latter’s construction includes income+ The squared income indicator is not used in models
with output as the dependent variable because there is no theoretical or empirical argument for assum-
ing a non-linear effect+
66+ See Gleditsch and Sverdrup 2003; Li and Reuveny 2006; Congleton 1992; and Midlarsky 1998+
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democracy, and climate risk variables+ Iceland scores very high on democracy and
policy output, but very low on climate risk+ Suriname scores very high on climate
risk and very low on policy output+ Andorra scores very high on democracy, but
very low on policy output+ We then cross-examined the results in five more ways:
by using six alternative indicators for democracy; by separately estimating the
effects of democracy on the four component indicators of the policy output index;
by using alternative indicators for climate risk, income, mitigation costs, and trade
openness; by adding additional control variables; and by defining an overall cli-
mate policy performance index, implementing the explanatory model for this depen-
dent variable and a climate policy performance measure provided by another source
~Germanwatch!,67 and comparing the results+ None of these robustness checks
changed the conclusions in important ways+
We focused on the last robustness check in some more detail+68 We replaced our
indicators for the dependent variable with the hitherto most widely used index for
national performance in climate change policy, the Climate Change Performance
Index ~CCPI! by Germanwatch+69 This index combines data for emission levels
~30 percent weight!, emission trends ~50 percent weight!, and climate policy ~20
percent weight!+ Its 2008 version is available for fifty-six countries ~compared to
the more than 180 countries in our data set!+ We standardized the CCPI to the
same scale ~0+ + +1, 1 indicating strongest performance! used for all definitions of
the dependent variable in Table 3 ~gwscore!+ For purposes of comparison, we
constructed a similar index based on our own data set, with the same weights of
the three components ~output 20 percent, emisstrend 50 percent, emisslevel
 30 percent, cpperform!+
Table 4 shows that the results for the democracy effect are positive and signif-
icant for both overall indices of climate policy performance+ The caveat is, how-
ever, that such overall measures obfuscate important differences between policy
output and policy outcome, as shown in Table 3+ We also replaced our policy out-
put index with the policy component of the Germanwatch index+ The results ~not
shown here! for the democracy effect are the same as for the models including our
policy output index+
As shown above, democracies find it particularly difficult to match “words and
deeds+” The final step in our analysis offers at least a partial explanation for this+
Some studies suggest that advanced industrialized countries experience particu-
larly serious difficulties in cutting emissions in the transportation sector, whereas
poorer countries experience higher growth rates in GHG emissions from electric-
ity and heat production+70 Large point sources ~such as thermal power plants!
are, in technical and monitoring0enforcement terms, easier to control than trans-
67+ Germanwatch 2008+
68+ The results of all robustness checks are available from the authors+
69+ Germanwatch 2008+
70+ See, for example, Jahn 2008; and International Energy Agency 2007+
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portation+ Moreover, democratic governments may find it harder to restrict indi-
vidual freedom by imposing constraints on personal mobility+ To the extent that
these assumptions hold true, we should observe a negative effect of democracy
on emissions from transportation+ Table 5 offers support for this argument+
The dependent variable is defined as the average annual growth of CO2 emis-
sions per capita in 1990–2004 from energy and heat production as well as trans-
portation+ Again, we inverted the scale and standardized the dependent variables
to a 0 to 1 range; higher values indicate smaller or negative emission growth rates+
As to CO2 emissions from electricity and heat production, the biggest effects ema-
nated from 1990 emission levels and the environmental Kuznets curve+ Countries
that had higher emission levels per capita in this sector in 1990 experienced lower
growth rates thereafter, and poorer countries experienced higher emission growth
rates than richer countries+ Interestingly, democratic countries experienced greater
difficulties in cutting emissions in the transportation sector+ The effect of democ-
racy was negative and significant+71 Moreover, better performance in policy out-
71+ The 95 percent confidence interval for the democracy coefficient includes zero, but when we
drop 1990 CO2 levels because of their high correlation with income, the coefficient becomes signifi-
cantly different from zero+
TABLE 4. Results for overall indices of climate
policy performance
Variables
Model 1
gwscore
Model 2
cpperform
democracy 0+0520*** 0+0154***
~0+0171! ~0+0055!
cci 0+3445* 0+1883***
~0+1766! ~0+0557!
income 0+8427 0+5024***
~0+6667! ~0+1146!
income^2 0+0421 0+0264***
~0+0373! ~0+0069!
gdpgrowth 0+0285** 0+0121**
~0+0133! ~0+0056!
co2cap1990 0+0289*** 0+0028*
~0+0064! ~0+0017!
tradeopen 0+1436** 0+0030
~0+0564! ~0+0180!
Constant 4+8564 2+9467***
~2+9606! ~0+4688!
Observations 55 171
R-squared 0+583 0+452
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses+ * significant at 10%; **
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%+
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put terms had a significant, negative effect on performance in terms of emission
trends in the transportation sector+ This finding shows that the ambiguous democ-
racy effect on policy outcomes shown in Table 3 may, at least to some extent,
stem from the fact that democracies are finding it particularly difficult to restrict
individual freedom and curb transport-related emissions+We return to this issue in
the conclusions+
Conclusion
In focusing on the implications of democracy for the provision of global public
goods, this article addresses an important gap in the international relations and
comparative politics literature+ The latter deals primarily with the effects of democ-
racy on domestic public goods provision and dyadic international behavior+ We
have concentrated on climate change, one of the most important and complex global
TABLE 5. Democracy effects on CO2 emission
trends in electricity and heat production and
transport
Model 1
co2electr&heat
Model 2
co2transport
democracy 0+0045 0+0238*
~0+0082! ~0+0120!
cci 0+1273 0+0143
~0+1196! ~0+0734!
income 0+4769** 0+1192
~0+1849! ~0+2140!
income2 0+0275** 0+0102
~0+0109! ~0+0132!
gdpgrowth 0+0034 0+0122
~0+0067! ~0+0117!
co2electr&heat1990 0+0122***
~0+0043!
co2transport1990 0+0015
~0+0168!
tradeopen 0+0147 0+0112
~0+0292! ~0+0305!
output 0+0214 0+1552*
~0+0570! ~0+0813!
Constant 2+6192*** 1+0396
~0+7615! ~0+8586!
Observations 103 107
R-squared 0+177 0+170
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses+ * significant at 10%; ** sig-
nificant at 5%; *** significant at 1%+
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public goods challenges facing humankind+ The empirical testing was done on a
cross-section of 185 countries in 1990–2004+
The results show that the effect of democracy on political commitment to global
public goods provision ~policy output! is positive+ In contrast, the democracy effects
on policy outcomes, measured in terms of emission levels and trends, are ambig-
uous+ The analysis of sectoral emissions suggests that the ambiguous democracy
effect in the analysis of total emissions is at least in part due to the negative democ-
racy effect on emissions from transportation+ These results demonstrate that, in
moving from political commitments to GHG reductions, the democracy effect has
up to this point in time not been able to override countervailing forces that ema-
nate from the free-rider problem, the discounting of future benefits of climate change
mitigation, and other factors that cut against efforts to reduce emissions+
The research reported in this article has interesting implications for inter-
national relations theory as well as climate change policy+ The implications for
international relations theory are that ambiguous findings in the existing literature
with respect to the effects of democracy on domestic public goods provision and
dyadic international behavior can be identified also in the area of global public
goods provision, particularly for policy outcomes+ Studying political commitment
and environmental behavior side by side thus produces insights that are missing in
studies that concentrate only on one or the other dependent variable+ In climate
change policy, democracies are clearly more responsive at the political-commitment
than at the problem-solving level, not only in absolute terms, but also relative to
nondemocracies+
It would be interesting to explore whether more democratic countries experi-
ence larger “words-deeds” gaps in other policy areas, and whether there are sys-
tematic differences of this kind between domestic and international commitments
and across different policy areas+ The comparative politics and political economy
literature allows for two competing hypotheses+72 One assumes that in democra-
cies with a well-informed electorate and strong competition for political offices,
policymakers who promise more than they can implement experience political
costs, for example an increased risk of losing elections+ The other assumes
that growing mediatization of politics and other factors that have increased the
extent of competition for electoral support motivate policymakers to become more
“adventurous” with respect to political commitments+ To the extent that voters
are myopic and “overdosed” by competing information and political claims, pol-
icymakers in advanced democracies can get away lightly with increased “words-
deeds” gaps+
The recent international relations literature tends to side with the first assump-
tion+ Several authors have argued that democracies have stronger domestic enforce-
ment mechanisms than nondemocracies, and that their decisions to engage in
international commitments will thus be more closely aligned with policy out-
72+ See, for example, Persson and Tabellini 2000; and Kriesi 2008+
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comes+73 Von Stein hypothesizes that “democracies + + + are more likely to keep
their international promises—in large part because they only make promises they
know they can keep+”74 The approach taken in this article, which uses a unified
analytical framework to study policy output, outcome, and gaps between the two,
helps in testing this claim without narrowing the focus to legally binding obliga-
tions and formal compliance+ Hence it is more in line with the recent literature on
the effectiveness of international regimes, which conceptualizes effectiveness pri-
marily in terms of problem solving rather than legal compliance+75 In using self-
selected political commitment levels rather than formal treaty obligations as the
benchmark, it also avoids the “constrain or screen” problem inherent in studies
focusing on formal treaty commitments and compliance+76 In contrast to empirical
results on ~positive! democracy effects on compliance in the human rights and
monetary policy area,77 our analysis shows that democracy is associated with a
bigger implementation gap in climate change policy+ This contrasting evidence
appears quite worrying from a normative perspective+ The remainder of this sec-
tion thus concentrates on its policy implications+
In climate change policy, democracies have obviously had a slow start in mov-
ing from commitments to emission reductions+ This should not come as a great
surprise+ Climate change is a much more complex challenge than most local or
regional environmental degradation issues, such as air and water pollution+ It is
also characterized by a global free-rider problem+
However, there are signs that more democratic countries are likely to perform
better over the long run in policy outcome terms as well+ As argued in the theory
section of this article, public and interest group demand for climate change miti-
gation is likely to be stronger in democracies than in nondemocracies+ The avail-
able empirical evidence in fact suggests that public concern over climate change
risks tends to be higher in democracies, independently of income+ This is also true
of environmental NGO activity+78 Moreover, democracies tend to have higher
73+ See, for example, von Stein 2008b+
74+ Ibid, quotation from abstract+
75+ See, for example, Helm and Sprinz 2000; Siegfried and Bernauer 2007+
76+ See von Stein 2005+
77+ See, for example, von Stein 2008a+
78+ The lack of large-N data for public demand for climate change mitigation prevents us from
systematically testing whether democracy has a positive effect on such demand+ However, we can
muster some, albeit sketchy support from surveys, for example, the one carried out in about forty
countries by the Program on International Policy Attitudes ~PIPA!; available at ^http:00www+pipa+org0&+
accessed 14 January 2009+ The PIPA survey data covers the years 2003 and 2006+ The respondents
were asked whether “climate change or global warming, due to the greenhouse effect” is a serious
problem+ This survey measures public concern over climate change risks+ We regressed this data on
income and democracy and found that democracy has a significant, positive effect on such concern+
We also examined the determinants of Greenpeace membership per capita ~von Stein 2008a! and included
this indicator in the models reported in Table 3+ Greenpeace is well known for its strong position in
favor of large GHG emission cuts+ Its membership may serve as a proxy for how strong interest group
pressure for climate change mitigation is+ We found that democracy is a significant, positive predictor
of Greenpeace membership independently of other potential determinants ~for example, income!+ In
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income levels, and the available data shows that the environmental Kuznets curve
for GHG emissions has already reached a turning point in most of the rich and
democratic countries+ Democracies are, independently of income, also more active
in environmental monitoring and research and development79—this increases
knowledge about risks and generates new technologies that are more energy effi-
cient+ Democracies also tend to perform better in terms of sustainable develop-
ment more broadly defined ~for example, as measured in the form of the World
Bank’s Index of Adjusted Net Savings and the Center for International Earth Sci-
ence Information Network’s Environmental Performance Index!+80 It is hard to
see why this pattern should not extend to global environmental problems, such as
climate change, at least in the long run+ The evidence presented in this article is
largely congruent with this argument+ In combination with the assumption that
democratic institutions are more likely to motivate policymakers to supply poli-
cies that meet public and interest group demand for climate change mitigation,
these findings leave considerable room for optimism+
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